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Introduction 
 
In the context of a fragile political and security situation, an ambiguous legal 
constitutional status and an imprecise and contested balance of power between 
international ‘protection’ and local ownership, academic and practitioner strategies in 
Kosovo have emphasized human protection, military security and public law and 
order. However, Kosovo is also a site of contention between economic norms. On the 
one hand, the external agencies have attempted to impose a neoliberal economic 
model, rooted in the 1989 Washington consensus on developmentalism. On the 
other hand, Kosovars have clung to clientism, shadow economic activities and 
resistance to centrally-audited exchange. 
 This chapter contends that these interactions led to accommodation by the 
external and domestic actors, but also friction and contest. To some extent the 
protectors have cushioned the population from the rigours of neoliberalism by 
investing in public services; to some extent Kosovar Albanians have accepted the 
conditionalities of the peacebuilders as a means to secure independence. By the end 
of 2002 the population of 1.8 million had benefited from donor reconstruction aid 
worth €2 billion. Indeed, economic growth officially increased dramatically in the first 
two years after the war thanks to donor support, diaspora remittances and UNMIK 
spending on goods and services. The budget had considerable cash balances 
reflecting donor contributions, revenue gains from excise duties, the phasing in of 
income tax and strict monetarist rules on spending. In the absence of reliable official 
statistics, surveys indicated that per capita gross domestic product (gdp) had climbed 
significantly above the pre-war level by 2003. However, these calculations certainly 
underestimated the size of the pre-conflict gdp because the service sector was 
excluded from the Yugoslav accounting system.1 Furthermore, the Banking and 
Payments Authority estimated that in 2002 only about 20 per cent of post-conflict gdp 
was domestically generated, the rest comprising foreign aid (50 per cent) and 
remittances (30 per cent).2 In spite of the internationally-financed reconstruction 
boom, the economy remained one of the weakest in Europe and growth had slowed 
down from 11.1 per cent in 2001 to 7.0 per cent in 2002.3 In effect capital expenditure 
has floated on aid; the domestic authorities are left to fund institutional growth and 
 1
recurrent disbursements. The weak economic recovery has reflected a long-standing 
neglect of agricultural and industrial investment, disruption and migration caused by 
the war, and the uncertainty about Kosovo’s future constitutional status, which 
inhibits post-war investment.   
The purpose of this chapter is to interrogate three critical aspectsof Kosovo’s post-
war political economy: ‘criminality’; unaccountable external economic governance; 
and neoliberal development policy. It argues that Kosovo’s post-conflict 
transformation policies and practices contain contradictions that risk frustrating the 
goals of economic growth and European integration, and which do little to alleviate 
the pressing issues of poverty and unemployment. But first it is essential to sketch 
antecedents of Kosovo’s political economy that confronted the external actors in 
1999.  
 
Lineages of Resistance and Dislocation 
 
Throughout south-east Europe the heads of clans traditionally offered social stability 
through the distribution of land, revenues and welfare. Ottoman and subsequent 
Habsburg efforts to establish property rights in law failed to eradicate the robust 
clientist and patrimonial systems.4 Moreover, shadow economies of barter and black 
markets thrived in the Tito period and permitted the avoidance of socially-
discriminating and time-consuming bureaucratic obstacles to exchange. Shadow 
economies, local predation, and reversion to clientist and patrimonial protection of 
the exposed populations accompanied the economic fragmentation of Yugoslavia.5
Paralysis of the Yugoslav command economy was, however, significantly worsened 
by structural adjustment and austerity in the 1980s introduced at the behest of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Purchasing power fell by 30 per cent between 
1983 and 1985. By 1990, unemployment had reached about 20 per cent, and 
perhaps as much as 60 per cent of the Yugoslav population was living at, or below, 
the poverty line.6  
In Kosovo formal gdp subsequently contracted by an estimated 50 per cent in the 
period 1989 to 1994.7 Secession, war and sanctions further encouraged predatory 
war entrepreneurs to demand a cut from smuggling, and invigorated shadow trading 
as an international business that benefited crime syndicates and corrupt officials.8 In 
turn, the conflicts were fuelled by wealth derived from transit trafficking in drugs, 
weapons, migrants, refugees and women forced into the sex industry.  
Oddly enough, Kosovo remained relatively quiescent during the wars further west, 
though Kosovo Polje was the stage which Slobodan Milošević had used to rally Serb 
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nationalism in 1987 and plunge the federal state into political crisis. In spite of rising 
unemployment, a precipitous deterioration of the formal economy and political and 
cultural repression by the Serb authorities, the Kosovar Albanians failed to seize the 
opportunity of war in Croatia and Bosnia–Herzegovina to overthrow Serb control. To 
a large degree this level of neutrality depended on Ibrahim Rugova’s strategy of 
forging democratic change through the creation of parallel social, economic and 
political structures. However, a kind of pax mafiosa also emerged. Sanctions spurred 
the trade in Turkish heroin and other goods across borders, boosting incomes in the 
area. Much of it was arranged by three gangsters with connections to state security: 
Zeljko Ražnatović (Arkan) in Serbia; Momcilo Mandić, a member of the Karadžić 
government in Republika Srpska; and Enver Hajin of the Albania Secret Police. The 
Serbs connived at protecting the route through Bulgaria, Serbia, Budapest and 
Bratislava, much of it around Plovdiv controlled by a Kosovar, Nazim Delegu.9 In 
essence, the pax produced a reciprocal relationship of intimidation and subsistence 
that enabled people to cope and survive which seems to have contributed to keeping 
Kosovo relatively peaceful. In spite of power struggles with the Croatian and Italian 
mafiosi over trafficking, the Albanian Kosovars, in collaboration with the Italian 
‘Ndrangheta asserted control of the heroin traffic, laundering the revenues in 
Switzerland, and financing their own insurrection.10  
The militarization of the Kosovar Albanian struggle, the contest over trafficking 
and the failure of the 1995 Dayton Accord to address Albanian political ambitions 
combined to wreck Rugova’s strategy. The peace crumbled in 1997 when a cascade 
of arms looted from military and police depots in Albania worked its way northwards. 
The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) centred on the Jashari clan was the main 
beneficiary of the Albanian weapons liberation of 1997 and continued to profit from 
trafficking. Under the leadership of Hashim Thaçi the KLA became not only a guerrilla 
force, but an economic structure for controlling the labour market and providing black 
market civilian goods.11 By early 1998, the KLA’s shadow economy began to co-exist 
with, and often within, Rugova’s parallel economy. This embedding of trafficking 
corporations in the regional economies proved to be an enduring legacy of the 
Yugoslav wars. 
 
Meanings of Criminality 
 
It is a commonplace perception, both within and beyond Kosovo, that the territory 
remains a major hub of organized crime. Indeed south-east Europe’s political 
economies seem to have been archived as ‘criminalized’.12 Regional traffickers and 
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corrupt political leaders have been held responsible by external peacebuilding 
agencies for resistance to economic modernization and integration with the world 
economy. 13 As a legal concept, the term ‘criminal’ signifies behaviour contrary to 
legislative controls and beyond the rule of law. Economically, it connotes the 
avoidance of audited revenue payments that would otherwise be available for local 
authority and government distribution. Politically, it is portrayed as a threat to 
transparency and accountability, and thus a threat to sustainable democracy. As a 
social concept, ‘crime’ indicates moral debasement. But such discussions of ‘crime’ 
tend to lack a nuanced understanding of its variations, its relationship to legitimate 
activities and the inadvertent role of external policies in its perpetuation. Indeed, 
there is a deeper issue of morality, particularly where people are directly harmed, 
such as trafficking in women and children. From an ethical perspective, any strategy 
of human protection should undertake to eliminate rights abuses of this kind, and 
external intervenors merit plaudits for action to protect the abused. The negative 
perceptions and representations serve to distance the supposedly virtuous, law-
abiding cores of capitalist democracy from phenomena that are categorized as 
threats to their social well-being. These same cores, and the international financial 
institutions, are thereby exonerated from complicity in sustaining the demand for 
shadow activity. 
 Economic ‘crime’ in Kosovo can be deconstructed into at least three varieties of 
‘shadow economy’: organized mafia rackets and trafficking; corruption, fraud and 
nepotism in business and public life; and the coping or survival shadow economies of 
the population at large. To some degree these varieties overlap (a university 
professor may take bribes to cope with a newly impoverished status, for example). 
And they probably all draw on traditions of economic organization that resisted the 
pressures of modern, centralized and audited economic exchange well before the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia.14  
 
Organized crime 
 
With regard to organized crime, the conflicts of the 1990s opened up new 
opportunities and incentive structures for ruthless, predatory and socially 
destabilising mafia networks and corrupt rentiers to gain from clientism, trafficking 
and black marketeering. As noted above, sanctions busting through Kosovo’s 
borders became a highly lucrative economic strategy. In the post-conflict period 
entrepreneurs adapted by expanding the shadow spaces for trafficking in weapons, 
goods and people. In this project they were inadvertently assisted by the priorities 
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and dynamics of peacebuilding based on the neoliberal model.15 The economic 
priorities of the post-conflict ‘protectorate’ presented opportunities for further wealth 
creation among the victors of the conflict.  
In particular, arms trafficking has remained a source of income. Dedicated to 
becoming the army of an independent state, the KLA had formed a separate social, 
criminal and military structure whose abilities to take over local municipalities were 
demonstrated after the Yugoslav forces vacated Kosovo.16 The KLA had also 
acquired former Yugoslav petrol companies and fuel distribution and controlled petrol 
stations which are used for money laundering.17 KFOR and the UN Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) chose not to confront the KLA and 
enforce disarmament, but instead coerced it into an Undertaking on Demilitarization 
for arms control and demobilization in June 1999.18 The policy was dictated by the 
notion that accessibility to weapons was too widespread to make wholesale 
disarmament effective.19 The KLA was officially disbanded and replaced by the 
Kosovo Protection Corps as a civil emergency force issued with light weapons only. 
Supposedly under strict international control, the Corps is regarded as an army in 
waiting. It has participated in violence against minorities, intimidated the Kosovo 
Police Service and judiciary and is engaged in organized crime and weapons 
trafficking.20
 About a third of the half a million weapons looted in Albania in 1997 remain at 
large, many of them passing through Kukes where they have been sold to Albanian 
nationalists in Kosovo and Macedonia. Other Kukes consignments reach the 
Albanian port of Vlores a transit centre for weapons taken across the Adriatic into the 
European Union. Assorted military weapons are found in ordinary homes, and AK47s 
can be purchased for as little as US$35. In 2003 a UN Development Programme 
(UNDP) flagship initiative aimed to restore public confidence in security through a 
weapons armistice. Only 155 items were handed in during a short-lived armistice 
after a year’s preparation.21 Although the murder rate is no worse than elsewhere 
central-east Europe, between 330,000 and 460,000 weapons are believed to be in 
civilian hands and are used more often than elsewhere.22 Some weapons are held for 
protection in the event of conflict recurring, as was demonstrated during the ethnic 
cleansing of Serb, Roma and Ashkali minorities throughout Kosovo in March 2004 in 
which 19 people died (while the local police and international units took no preventive 
action).23 But they are also used by youths to demonstrate prowess and by rival KLA 
factions following the disbandment of the organisation. Murders have as much to do 
with disaffected youth and gangsterism, as with the politics of ethnicity. Gang warfare 
directed against a notorious Gashi family in Kosovo was responsible for a car bomb 
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in Sarajevo that killed a Gashi associate in January 2004.24 Attacks against 
protectorate personnel also continue – though it was probably inadvertently symbolic 
that in 2003 a violent affray injured members of a World Bank delegation in a 
Mitrovica pizzeria.25  
 
Corruption 
 
Corruption, the misuse of public office or private business for illegal gain, is perhaps 
less directly life-threatening than the gangsterism of organized crime. Moreover, 
surveys and indices of corruption related to the misuse of public office indicate that it 
may not be pervasive in government processes, and that Kosovo fares better than 
neighbouring communities on scales of tolerance, practices and the ability of the 
authorities to deal with it.26  
Yet the issue remains serious and expert opinion reports endemic corruption, 
particularly among the legal, medical, educational and other professional classes, 
and in the power and telecommunications companies. In November 2003 the head of 
UNMIK, Harri Holkeri, had to set up a new unit to counter corruption in budget-funded 
enterprises – and within UNMIK’s own ranks after a UN official was found guilty of 
embezzling €4.5 million from the power company.27 The EU and other donors had 
invested upwards of €700 million in reviving the existing power system, but the 
system produces less than before the conflict and shortages continue; only about a 
third of the customers actually pay for what they use. Bribery and corruption 
concerning building permits and the illegal construction of thousands of buildings had 
also led to an investigation against local politicians.28 In 2002 a sacked customs 
officer claimed that international officials were hiding a major corruption problem, and 
subsequently the head of the customs service, Ylber Rraçi, was charged with fraud 
and abuse of power.29 In addition, the failure to regulate financial activities seems to 
have made it easy to launder money and engage in lottery fraud.30 Experts also 
consider that processes of privatization are prone to abuse and without safeguards 
could become a ‘de facto money laundering operation’.31 Indeed, there are concerns 
that privatization will follow the same course as in Bosnia and Herzegovina where it 
enriched an elite of war entrepreneurs and their political protectors.32 Former KLA 
fighters, including the Thaçi family, are prominent among the beneficiaries. In 
January 2000 UN police raided the apartment of Gani, elder brother of the political 
leader Hashim, and found 500,000 marks in cash, which he claimed had been paid to 
him for intermediary services by a Canadian construction firm working in Kosovo 
(though the firm’s director maintained the fee was in the region of only 120,000 
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marks).33
The issue mobilized USAID and the East-West Management Institute to launch a 
major anti-corruption programme with a major conference in Priština in March 2002, 
attended by some 200 people, mainly from cadres of capitalism but also from unions 
and NGOs.34 Ordinary Kosovars were increasingly disenchanted with the former 
KLA’s protection rackets, trafficking and deadly power struggles. Disciples of free-
market capitalism also regard the widespread fraud and corruption in day-to-day 
business as detrimental to fair competition. Lack of transparency in business 
practices and an absence of regulatory frameworks, for example, lead to insider 
dealing.35 Confronted by the scale of the problem, the institutions promoting free-
market enterprise have paradoxically counselled stricter regulation, oversight and 
accountability mechanisms, financial disclosure provisions and the engagement of 
NGOs and civil society in anti-corruption schemes. Such measures would no doubt 
contribute to transforming the economic environment by removing local resistance to 
audited exchange and providing equal opportunities to corporate capitalism and 
foreign investors. Nevertheless, the main obstacle to removing corruption is 
economic stagnation and low purchasing power.36 Reducing corruption and fraud, 
like reducing the shadow economies that enable the poor to cope and survive, is thus 
contingent on improvement in the general economic situation.  
 
Coping and survival 
 
Shadow economic activity has been a means of coping and surviving for sections of 
the population throughout south-east Europe. The power of mafia and clientist 
networks is sustained partly because it performs a social function. For example, in 
Republika Srpska shadow economies increase personal consumption, productivity 
and employment, improve the variety of goods and services, and reduce social 
inequalities, adding more than 50 per cent to the domestic product.37 The black 
market may also be considered a kind of ‘free’ market, or at least ‘managed’ in a 
sense not dissimilar from the management of capitalism. For example, as with free 
markets, successful entrepreneurship depends as much on social networks of 
assistance, protection and marketing as much as competitive pricing. In this sense, 
too, the black market provides a social function in underpinning networks of clientism 
and allegiance: ‘self-help groups’ par excellence.    
 Equally salient, the anti-crime offensives in Kosovo have been hampered by the 
inability of the external actors to link such offensives to poverty-reduction and job 
creation strategies. Failure to comprehend the social functions of ‘crime’ has led in 
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equal measure to hubris, frustration and self-exoneration on the part of the external 
actors.  
 
Unaccountable Economic Governance 
 
In its own lack of transparency and accountability, UNMIK has been widely-perceived 
as a sorry exemplar of institution building. Perhaps because UNMIK has been run 
from the militarily-orientated UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the 
mission to Kosovo has lacked knowledge about the local legal system, shown 
insufficient respect for local traditions and marginalized locally-elected 
representatives in terms of policy input. By 2003, the unaccountable international 
agencies were reportedly losing respect.38
 
Implementing an Ultimatum 
 
The UN mission seemed to have a relatively uncomplicated palimpset on which to 
etch an economic future. Clearly there were considerable difficulties apart from 
economic resistance in the shadow economies. These included the legacies of 
discrimination against the Albanians and their lack of property rights; the capture of 
municipal authorities by the KLA; poor rural infrastructure; a gross imbalance in 
wealth and opportunity between rural and urban areas; and the creation of parallel 
Serb structures dependent on Belgrade for security, health, education, welfare and 
public utilities. Nevertheless, wealth re-distribution was facilitated by the small 
population size and the expulsion or marginalization of previously privileged Serb 
workers, administrators and professionals. Commercial law, administrative and 
financial institutions could be virtually created from scratch. Moreover, UNMIK simply 
expropriated state assets. Chief among them was the huge, but decrepit and heavily 
indebted, Trepča state mining and smelting complex near Mitrovica. UNMIK troops 
seized the complex from Serb control as a prelude to its transfer to foreign 
consortia.39 But most of the works remain closed on account of sulphur dioxide 
discharge, acid pollution and flooded mine workings. A major source of employment 
is thus denied to Serbs, though UNMIK paid some 1,000 workers to clean up the 
complex.40  
 Above all, NATO came armed with an economic vision that its most powerful 
members had already inserted into the Rambouillet ultimatum of 23 February 1999 
before the war. The diktat that ‘the economy of Kosovo shall function in accordance 
with free market principles’ became integral to the NATO/KLA war aim of securing 
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the territory from Serb authority.41 The economic principles were not actually spelt out 
at Rambouillet, but it was assumed that they were valid and should be imposed. 
Security Council resolution 1244 of 10 June was less presumptive, but supported 
economic development through the Balkan Stability Pact, which in turn specified free 
market economies throughout the region.  
 
The Constitutional Framework 
 
In keeping with NATO’s imperialism, UNMIK then arrogated the right to stipulate in 
the constitutional framework that Kosovo must adopt a neoliberal economy.42 
Kosovo’s leaders had little choice but to agree if they wanted to gain independence 
eventually.43 The constitutional framework was formulated by UNMIK, ‘the Quint’ (the 
UK, United States, Germany, France and Italy), the Contact Group (including 
Russia), and the G8 (plus Canada and Japan), and promulgated by the Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) in May 2001. It confirmed that 
UNMIK had the ultimate authority to decide that Kosovo’s economic welfare would be 
fostered through the development of a market economy. The economy would thus be 
harmonized with what was loosely characterized as the ‘Euro-Atlantic community’s 
developmental standards’. Charged with responsibility for economic reconstruction 
(Pillar 4 in the UNMIK architecture), the EU operates through its European Agency 
for Reconstruction, which reports to the European Commission as well as to UNMIK. 
Indeed, complaints by UNMIK about the parallel structures of the former KLA and the 
Serb minority lack moral authority when the external actors protect their own 
parallelism. Completely outside UNMIK, USAID is another influential actor, which at 
the end of 1999 commanded a regulatory framework for the financial sector in the 
form of the Banking and Payments Authority. 
UNMIK exercises exclusive control and regulation over economic policy and 
personnel, and over public and socially-owned property and enterprises.44 When 
some members of the UN Security Council, such as Russia, regarded changes to 
property rights as an infringement of sovereignty, the head of the EU pillar, Joly 
Dixon, retorted that UNMIK and not the Security Council would decide the details for 
administering Kosovo.45 Development benchmarks were subsequently imposed on 
Kosovo, including the adoption of the deutschmark and then euro, without any direct 
input by Kosovars.46 Moreover, the constitutional framework specified that the SSRG 
would decide the parameters of budgetary and monetary policy.47 The SRSG 
convenes and presides over the Economic and Fiscal Council (operated by 
Americans and Australians paid by USAID)48 and appoints its international and 
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Kosovar members. The SRSG appoints the international Auditor General, the 
international and Kosovar members of the Governing Board of the Banking and 
Payments Authority (acting as the central bank) and verifies the locally elected 
directors of the Customs Service and Tax Inspectorate. 
 
Industrial Control 
 
Following the creation of a Department of Trade and Industry in December 2000, an 
UNMIK regulation (No. 2002/12 of May 2002) set up the Kosovo Trust Agency as the 
landlord and trustee of socially- and publicly- owned property. Exclusively under 
international control and operated by EU staff and USAID contractors, the Trust 
Agency, aims to ‘preserve or enhance the value, viability, and corporate governance 
of socially owned and public enterprises in Kosovo’. It does so by selling them off. 
The legal basis for this project is cloudy because constitutionally Kosovo is part of a 
state which owns them, and the ownership of many state enterprises was forcibly 
taken over by KFOR (in the case of the Trepca complex) or by the KLA.  The initial 
goal was privatization of 500 companies, in the face of trade union and Belgrade’s 
opposition. Socially-owned enterprises have been operating at a third of capacity, 
employing 30,000 workers with another 30,000 on unpaid leave, out of Kosovo’s total 
employed labour force of 341,000.49 Kosovar researchers have accused the 
Department of Trade and Industry of unwittingly reinstating the badly malfunctioning 
self-management system of former Yugoslavia by reviving elected worker’s councils. 
In the absence of a Department of Trade and Industry  field presence to exert 
authority, the councils are permanently locked in disputes with self-appointed KLA 
strongmen who sell off stock and rent out premises to line their own pockets.50 
According to its critics, the Trust Agency’s own lack of transparency adds to 
perceptions of corruption. It has also displayed limited understanding of the needs of 
the private sector for access to basic infrastructure and property titles, and it has 
been unable to tackle the essential prerequisite of reforming registry and ownership. 
Instead private enterprise has become parasitic on the ailing infrastructures of state 
industry.51  
 
Crime Controls 
 
UNMIK learned the necessity of tackling shadow economies from experience in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, where anti-crime measures and institutions had been 
established slowly. UNMIK Customs was the first public body to be set up, and 
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together with EU Customs Assistance Mission (CAM-K) reformed the collection 
system, tripling revenues between 1999 and 2003.52 But with only seven CAM-K 
officers and a shortage of staff and processing capacity in the Customs Service, the 
control mechanisms are seriously deficient.53 It also took two years for the EU to 
establish a Kosovo Anti-Economic Crime Unit to counter crime and promote 
intolerance of criminality.54 Moreover, special processes were introduced for illegal 
activity by key political figures, which fostered a widely-held view that Kosovar 
leaders benefited from a degree of immunity.55 In effect, criminality was not seen as a 
high priority and an economic system was introduced that failed to curtail it. 
In contradiction to numerous declarations that Kosovo was to be governed in 
accordance with democratic principles, economic policy is determined by the EU, the 
international financial institutions and national aid agencies. Under the constitutional 
framework, the peoples of Kosovo are entitled to protect their ethnic, cultural, 
religious and linguistic identities, and to be free of economic discrimination. But they 
are denied the right to choose their economic future, and the choices made for them 
are inappropriate and poorly implemented. 
 
Neoliberal Developmentalism 
 
This does not mean that the external agencies have ignored all earlier experience of 
defective social protection in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nor have they been 
insensitive to the moral obligation to repair the economic damage and social 
displacement wrought by NATO itself during the war. The neoliberal credo of 
Rambouillet and the constitutional framework has been tempered in rhetoric and 
practice by programmes of social protection. 
 
Social Protection 
 
Thus the EU’s 2002 Action Programme gave priority to the delivery of public 
services, institution building, public administration and socially-oriented projects.56 
The UNDP emphasized employment generation through training programmes and 
social justice projects for ending ethnic and gender discrimination.57 The World Bank 
provided significant sums for social and public welfare and for poverty reduction 
through a Trust Fund.58 Together with the UNDP, the Bank also supported 
community initiatives for infrastructure rehabilitation and attempted to strengthen the 
income generation capacity of vulnerable rural families. Even the IMF proposed 
reform to facilitate long-term planning and stressed the need for investment in 
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education, health and social policy.59 In Kosovo, therefore, several partners in 
economic restructuring have acknowledged the importance of social justice, and 
have undertaken investment in poverty reduction and public services.  
 
Bare-knuckle Capitalism 
 
But in moving from reconstruction to development, the EU, the international financial 
institutions and the national aid agencies, notably USAID and the UK’s Department 
for International Development (which are not accountable to UNMIK), generally sing 
variations on the neoliberal tunes of monetarism, privatization, deregulation and state 
withdrawal from the economy.60 The adverse impacts of this agenda, in the view of 
many informed critics such as Joseph Stiglitz and George Soros, were already 
evident in central and eastern Europe.61 Undeterred by experience, the development 
assumptions of the external protectors were presented in policy reports, laws and 
regulations. As it was not a state, Kosovo could not qualify for World Bank and IMF 
loans. This might be deemed a blessing in disguise, but the international financial 
institutions could still provide advice and, as in the World Bank’s case subsidise 
‘economic reforms’, the budget ($16 million) and private sector development ($3 
million).62
An IMF delegation to Kosovo in November 2003 concluded that the main risks to 
the economy arose from serious governance problems in publicly-owned enterprises, 
an uncertain long-term economic outlook and pressures for rapid expansion in 
current spending. In spite of slackening growth, rising unemployment and falling 
purchasing power in 2002–03, the IMF welcomed curbs on consumption power and 
advised further controls on wages, social welfare, public sector employment and 
compensation for workers thrown out of work by privatization.63 Here, then, the IMF 
expressed its (long-discredited) structural adjustment model of fiscal stringency and 
deflationary curbs on government expenditure and consumption power. Deficit 
financing was not part of its lexicon, even in conditions of social distress. In the last 
quarter of 2001, an estimated 50 per cent of the population lived in poverty and 12 
per cent in extreme poverty.64 In the first quarter of 2003 the unemployment rate was 
estimated at between 49 and 57 per cent (70 per cent among 16-24 year olds); about 
25 per cent of the population were registered as job seekers.65 Not surprisingly, 
opinion surveys ranked unemployment and poverty among the greatest problems 
facing Kosovo.66 These were not, however, the top priorities of the external agencies. 
 
An Investor’s Charter  
 12
 International officials have had a seemingly inexhaustible faith in economic growth 
and jobs through the privatization of small to medium enterprises. Joly Dixon was a 
zealot for rapid privatization and reportedly wanted to sell off enterprises at a rate of 
20 a week.67 His White Paper on Enterprise Development Strategy ran into 
opposition from the unions and some Kosovar economists, as well as from Serbia 
and the UN Security Council. But state laws were introduced to ensure an investor-
friendly environment, including regulations on foreign investment, repatriation of 
capital, the purchase of real estate and the 99-year leases of land formerly controlled 
by socially-owned enterprises. These were deemed essential to wean the territory 
from its dependence on foreign aid.68  
Likewise, USAID’s credo has been: ‘to set in place institutions, practices, and 
policies that encourage and reward investment’, and ‘to work directly and intensively 
with businesses to create a dynamic, competitive and expanding private sector.’69 
USAID therefore fostered a mirror image of the US economy with a kind of investor’s 
charter masquerading as a development strategy. It aimed to:    
 
provide the framework for market-based economic growth that will permit 
self-sufficiency and enable Kosovo to achieve its economic aspirations in a 
free market environment. Under this strategic objective the policy and legal 
environment will be set in place, export barriers diminished, work will be 
completed on modern budget, tax and financial systems, and socially-
owned assets will be privatized.70
  
Accordingly, USAID focused on improving business capacity and the ability of 
business associations ‘to provide meaningful input in the development of economic 
policy and law… [and to] ensure an operating environment that supports business 
creation, market expansion, and rational investment.’ By August 2003, USAID had 
contributed $200 million to Kosovo, of which $46 million was spent on ‘economic 
policy’, and a further $42 million on private sector development (including agriculture 
and a business support programme). An example of Albanian Kosovars able to take 
advantage of this largesse to become one of the nouveau riche was Abdurrahman 
Konjufca. Dismissed as a consequence of Serbianisation policies from the state 
Shpendaria poultry concern by the Serb administration in 1990, Konjufca was able to 
invest US$1 million of development loans from USAID via the American Bank of 
Kosovo to gain control of the business after the war.71 However, these initiatives 
have provided little new employment; USAID’s substantial business support 
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programme had created a grand total of 635 jobs by August 2003.72 About half of the 
small to medium enterprises represent the restitution of traditional micro enterprises 
– the family or one-person small-holdings, pizzerias and kiosks. The majority were 
barely surviving, let alone driving economic growth.73
Privatization of former state and socially-owned companies was unlikely to 
compensate for the liquidation of decrepit industries and loss of industrial 
employment.74 The Trust Agency put six up for tender in May 2003, but interest was 
weak especially among foreign investors.75 Without employment alternatives, 
deindustrialization has encouraged emigration, leading to depletion of the territory’s 
skills pool and encouraged engagement in informal economic activity. Studies of 
reliance on foreign direct investment and privatization to stimulate economic growth 
suggest that productivity does not increase and benefits are heavily skewed towards 
entrepreneurs who take control of public enterprises.76 Foreign direct investment 
appears to make little impact on growth, according to the level of repatriated profits, 
but increases the risk of instability in production and consumption because of the 
volatility of external investment. Moreover, economic deregulation and withdrawal of 
the state from the economy contradicts the requirement for strong institutions of 
public authority. The effort accorded to social protection by the external actors has 
been consistently counteracted by the attention paid to introducing neoliberalism. In 
this context, shadow markets act as a survival mechanism, enabling people to exist 
at, or just above, the general poverty level.77   
 
An Alternative Conception 
 
The free market ideology represented as a normative model for post-conflict societies 
suppresses the contradiction inherent in nursing, protecting and subsidizing the 
investment and business sectors with public funds. In Kosovo, the rhetoric of support 
for private enterprise may disguise an absence of transformation on property laws 
and business-oriented infrastructure, but this represents a flaw in implementing the 
model, rather than a critique of the model itself. The externals ignore the effect of 
bare-knuckle capitalism in weakening social cohesion and political authority. 
Institution building and social welfare policies may have received closer attention 
from the external actors than has been the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but this 
has not deflected policy-makers from dictating an economic model which was given 
an unusual constitutional status to privilege profit-seeking entrepreneurs. The model 
entails fiscal austerity for a balanced budget and the inhibition of consumption power 
while large sums are spent in attempting to create a mirror image of aggressive 
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capitalism and to construct a political balance in favour of entrepreneurs. 
Controls over organized crime, and incentives to denounce corruption can 
certainly be improved, and as indicated earlier considerable effort could be made to 
deal with trafficking in people. Alternative strategies do need to confront the deeply 
immoral aspects of criminal activity. This can be done domestically through tough 
regulation, the monitoring of officials and draconian sanctions; and through the 
mobilization of civil society (including investigative journalism).78 Because shadow 
economies profit from the absence of cross-border policing and differential tax rates 
in south-east Europe, a regional approach to trade is also essential. Macedonia has 
a free trade agreement with Serbia that allows imports into Kosovo duty-free, while 
exports from Kosovo to Macedonia incur a 14 per cent tariff. Imports from Albania 
attract a tax of 26.5 per cent, while Kosovo’s neighbours only pay 15 per cent, 
thereby creating an incentive to misrepresent the origins and value of goods. 
However, regulation and policing do not address the functional basis of shadow 
economies when they are coping and survival mechanisms for the general populace 
in the absence of formal welfare provision.  An emphasis on legal controls and 
policing is unbalanced in that it criminalizes shadow markets while giving the 
unaccountable external protectors carte blanche to legalize socially stressful policies.  
 Economic expansion to make the territories less ‘crime’ dependent requires more 
openness to alternative approaches on the part of the external actors. An alternative 
route to growth would be based on fiscal policies that stimulate borrowing to build 
production capacity. A Keynesian recovery strategy for production and purchasing 
power would also build up social capital. ‘Pump priming’, even in the absence of a 
‘Marshall Plan’, and cheaper borrowing would stimulate consumption, savings and 
domestic investment.79 Modified forms of the protectionism that enabled the 
economies of the United States and the EU to flourish should not be denied to south-
east Europe. There is an element of fantasy about expecting Kosovo to engage in 
export-led growth and integrated free trade, especially as expert analysis indicates 
that growth leads to free trade rather than vice versa.80 Forms of protection might 
include inter alia: non-tariff barriers and subsidies to protect particularly vulnerable 
sectors such as agriculture; control of imports while liberalizing those vital for 
processing and trade; and devaluation only to a competitive exchange rate level. 
Economic priorities would thus shift to fostering production using underemployed 
resources, easing the demise of ailing industries, strengthening social capital, and 
providing a firmer basis for a long (perhaps fifteen-year) transformation to freer trade 
and integration with the EU. 
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Conclusion 
 
The archiving of the economies of the protectorates in south-east Europe as 
‘criminal’ overlooks the social welfare elements in shadow economies in the absence 
of state safety nets. The dominant international partners present in south-east 
Europe appear to have learned something of the importance of social protection from 
their experience of rubbing neoliberal salt into Bosnia’s war wounds. But the 
investment in social projects and poverty reduction does not compensate for the 
ideology of aggressive neoliberalism that perpetuates the dependence of the poor on 
shadow economies and keeps the mafiosi and war entrepreneurs in business. 
 The protectorate powers allowed no debate on the most appropriate economic 
systems to foster. NATO members went to war with an economic strategy already 
cast, and the EU and the international financial institutions were delegated a 
completely free hand to impose it. Consequently, the UNMIK and associated 
authorities have ultimate control over finance and budgets; there has been limited 
transfer of ownership over economic policy.  
The strategy may be summarized as macroeconomic stability to promote investor 
confidence, and the use of public money derived from government revenues in 
Kosovo and government budgets in aid donor countries to subsidize private capital 
acquisition and investment for profit. The intention may be not only to achieve macro-
economic stability, install a free enterprise culture and make Kosovo safe for foreign 
investment. Given concerns about organized crime, corruption and the shadow 
economies, UNMIK has exercised caution in relinquishing the levers of the economy 
to Kosovar leaders and has invested in a degree of social protection. But it has also 
meant that a meaningful role in economic decisions is denied to civil society and it is 
difficult for the population to hold Kosovar politicians responsible for the country’s 
economic welfare. This may be justifiable in so far as civil society is likely to have 
limited influence on economic policy, but it also seems to be the case that the 
international protectors define civil society in the narrow terms reminiscent of Adam 
Smith, as private enterprise to be given every assistance to counter the economic 
claims of the rest of civil society. Moreover, the international protectors seem to 
discount the extent to which an imported economic model, especially if rigorously 
imposed, reinforces the need for communities to protect themselves from the 
adverse impacts of neoliberalism and to spend as much as they think advisable on 
public infrastructure projects and public services.81
Dependence on governmental support to private enterprise contradicts the 
neoliberal ideology of the free market that the strategy claims to represent and 
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reproduce. In addition, it may be seriously doubted whether subsidizing business 
generates strong public institutions and economic growth in post-conflict contexts. 
Privatization is likely to further reward the war entrepreneurs who claimed the spoils 
of peace. At the same time, the neoliberal economic model inhibits the prospects for 
legitimate work, taxable economic exchange and an increase in consumption power. 
In the absence of alternative sources of income generation, dependence on shadow 
activity has therefore been a necessity for many workers and their families. 
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